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NOTES
"INTEREST ANALYSIS" FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT
OF LAWS PROBLEMS IN TORT - A GUIDE
FOR NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws provides the fol-
lowing definition: "Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each
state which determines what effect is given to the fact that the
case may have a significant relationship to more than one state."'
However, cases involving choice-of-law questions often do not lend
themselves to easy resolution. 2 It is the purpose of this Note to
acquaint North Dakota legal practitioners with "interest analysis"
as a process for resolving choice-of-law problems in tort. The use
and the abandonment of the lex loci delicti rule for the resolution
of conflict of laws problems in tort will be discussed and the respec-
ti-ve positions taken by the courts of North Dakota and Minnesota
with regard to "interest analysis" will be presented.3 It is submit-
ted that, because North Dakota and Minnesota are geographically
bounded, one by the other, with North Dakota's population centers
on the common boundary, it is likely that automobile accidents
and other torts involving Minnesota residents will occur on North
Dakota highways, as borne-out by caselaw discussed below. As the
respective parties become interrelated in choice-of-law problems,
so also do the conflicts laws of the respective states. Additionally,
the Note will explore the ramifications of those respective positions
as they relate to "interest analysis" and examine available alternative
approaches employing "interest analysis" for just resolution of torts
choice-of-law problems.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (P.O.D. I, 1967).
2. See Prosser, Interstate Pubication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953) which states:
The realm of the conflict of laws Is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The
ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in It.
See also R. WEINTRAUS, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) wherein the
author suggests that conflicts cases involving important and complex social problems must
be carefully thought out and solved in clear and understandable terms, so as to avoid
dysfunctional results.
3. The scope of this Note Is limited to discussion of Minnesota and North Dakota re-
garding "interest analysis" for those reasons stated In the text. Neither South Dakota nor
Montana has adopted "interest analysis", see notes 18, 19 infra, and are outside the scope
of this Note.
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II. LEX LOCI DELECTI
The traditional tort conflict-of-laws doctrine, adopted by the ori-
ginal Restatement, 4 required the application of the law of the place
of the injury5 The rights of the parties to an occurrence were
considered as having "vested ' 6 according to the law of the place
of the occurrence, the place of the injury being defined as the
state or jurisdiction where the last event' necessary to make an actor
liable has its injurious consequences.7 Proponents of the rule of lex
loci delicti argued that it offered a practical formula for resolution of
choice-of-law problems by providing uniformity of application, cer-
tainty of result, and ease of administration." However, it became
clear that the mechanical application of lex loci delicti to every multi-
state tort controversy often yielded harsh and unjust results, unre-
lated to the contemporary interests of the states involved or the
realistic expectations of the parties.9
To avoid undesirable results produced by the inflexibility of
the rule, various methods of "label-switching ' ' 1° were devised by
courts to escape the application of lex loci delicti without offending
stare decisis. By characterizing the issue as a matter of procedural
rather than of substantive law, courts were able to avoid application
of lex loci delicti. 11 Since forum law is generally applied to matters
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
5. The North Dakota Supreme Court enunciated this rule in Pearson v. Erb, 82 N.W.2d
818, 821 (N.D. 1957): "This accident, having happened in the State of Minnesota, the ha-
bilties of the parties must be determined according to the laws of that state." In Minne-
sota, adherence to this doctrine was stated as recently as Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457,
90 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1958).
6. Justice Holmes articulated the "vested rights" doctrine in Slater v. Mexican National
R. R . Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) :
But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of
the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree
is subject to the lex fori. . . . The theory of the foreign suit Is that although
the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it
gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows
the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found ....
But, as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act,
it follows that the law determines not merely the existence of the obliga-
tion . . . but equally determines its extent.
See A. EHRENZWEIO, CONFLITrs IN A NUTSHELL § 6 (1965) ; R. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 3 (1959) ; Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile Accidents, 1943 Wis. L. REV.
145, 150 (1943).
7. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
8. See Adams v. Knickerbocker Nature Study Soc'y, Inc. (Opinion of Griswold, J.),
cited in D. CAvERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 19, 20 (1965).
9. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d, 796, 803 (1964) where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that uniformity, predictability and simplicity of
application are "insufficient reasons to retain an unsound rule."
10. See Weintraub, The Enterging Problems in Judicial Administration of a State In-
terest Analysis of Tort Conflict of Laws Problems, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 889 (1971).
11. See Kllberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961) (limitation of damages); Grant v. McAullffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953) (survival of the cause of action). The Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 30, Issendorf
v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972), is indicative of the argument used by counsel to
persuade a court reluctant to apply lex loci delicti:
The real question confronting the court is whether or not the retroactive ap-
plication of the comparative negligence statute was a substantive change of
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of procedure, 12 avoidance of the doctrine was achieved by the forum
applying its own law at the outset to determine the particular matter
as "procedural" rather than "substantive.' 13 Similarly, a cause of
action might be characterized as contract, rather than tort. The result
of such characterization was that the applicable contract rule, whether
the law of the place where the contract was made or the law
of the place where the contract was to be performed, would displace
the rule of lex loci delicti. 14 Even a change in the characterization
label from "tort" to "family law" has been employed to achieve eva-
sion of the mechanical rule and its subsequent harsh result. 15 Un-
fortunately, in the process of implementing techniques of re-charac-
terization, the courts were deciding choice-of-law questions without
objective examination of the real choice influencing factors. As a re-
sult, uniformity and certainty, the applauded virtues of the rule, be-
came more illusory than real.16
Today, the majority of commentators on conflict of laws oppose
the mechanical application of lex loci delicti.1 Moreover, though in
Minnesota law and hence governed by the law of the place where the acci-
dent occurred, or was procedural and subject to the law of the place where
the case was tried, a practice so universally accepted that it does not serve
any purpose to present citations to that effect In this Brief.
But the North Dakota Supreme Court was disinclined to follow this argument, holding such
characterization "unsatisfactory" as an approach to the resolution of the choice of law
In tort cases. Id. at 754.
12. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 585 (1934). "All matters of procedure are
governed by the law of the forum."
19. Id. at § 584. See also Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41-42, 172
N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961).
14. In Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 133, 143 A. 163 (1928),
Connecticut law was applied by the court to Impose vicarious liability on a Connecticut
automobile renting agency by characterizing the plaintiff, who received injuries in Massa-
chusetts caused by a customer of the agency, as a third party beneficiary under the Con-
necticut bailment contract. Since the scope of this Note is limited to "interest analysis"
in tort, the development of the method in contract will not be discussed.
15. The court In Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959) departed from the place-of-the-wrong rule on the Issue of interspousal tort Immu-
nity. A husband and wife, domiciled In Wisconsin, were driving In California where the
wife was Injured by the husband's negligence. Overruling a long line of Wisconsin cases,
the court allowed suit by the wife against her husband and his liability Insurer under
Wisconsin law, even though, under California law, a California wife could not then main-
tain such a suit. The result was reached by reclassifying the immunity problem from one
of "tort" to one of "family law," where domicile usually controls the law to be applied."
Id. at 818. Although urged by many commentators as a characterization device which the
courts should use to avoid the unsatisfactory results of lex loci delecti. See Cook, LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (1942) (capacity to sue); STUMBERG,
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 205 (3d ed. 1963) (domestic relations); Ford, Inter-
spousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Ver-
sus the Restatement, 15 U. PiTT. L. REv. 397, 424 (1954) (status); Kelso, Automobile
Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilemmas, 33 IND. L.J. 297, 308 (1958)
(family relations). Label-switching from "tort" to "family law" merely replaced one ter-
ritorially-oriented rule with another.
16. Weintraub, Comments on Reich v. Prucell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 556 (1968).
17. See, 6.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173
(1933) ; Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952) ;
Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A R6cent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963) ; Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the
Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963) Leflax, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966) Reese, Comments on Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. RaV. 1212, 1251 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessaryf 37 TEX. L. REv. 657 (1959).
168 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the past decade several of the states have chosen to continue to ad-
here to that doctrine,18 a greater number have rejected lex loci de-
licti in favor of a more flexible and rational choice-of-law approach
to multistate tort cases.19
III. THE ADVENT OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
The Minnesota case of Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel20 has been at-
tributed, by at least one commentator,21 as being the decision that
heralded the advent of "interest analysis" as a replacement for lex
loci delicti, focusing on the policies underlying putatively conflicting
domestic tort rules. The plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, was injured
in an automobile accident in Wisconsin by a person who allegedly had
become intoxicated at defendant's bar in Minnesota. Plaintiff brought
suit under the Minnesota Dram Shop Act which imposes civil liabil-
ity on the seller under such circumstances. 22 Wisconsin, the place of
impact, 2  does not impose civil liability in such circumstances. The
Minnesota court rejected argument for the place of the wrong rule
and held that the Minnesota statute would apply. The decision was
based on the court's determination that the policies underlying the
Minnesota Dram Shop Act-control of the activities of Minnesota bar-
18. See Heldemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey,
481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137
(1969) ; Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968) ; Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd. 430 S.W.2d 182 (1968); Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 748, rev'd on rehearing, 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967) ;
Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 26 216 (1966) Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) ; McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark.
533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966) ; Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 898 P.2d 520 (Okla.
1965) ; Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965) ; Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d
594 (Del. 1965) ; McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965) ; Oshiek v. Oshiek,
244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
19. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972) ; Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc.,
25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971) ; Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970) ;
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 280, 243
A.2d 917 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1969) ; Armtrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699
(Alaska 1968) ; Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968) ; Schneider v. Nichols, 280
Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254
(1968) ; Casey v. Marson Constr. & Engineering Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967);
Milk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967) ; Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577
(D.C. Ct. of App. 1967) ; Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967) ; Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.25 259 (Ky. 1967) ; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.1. 351, 222 A.2d
205 (1966) ; Wartell v. Formusa, 34 I1. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d, 544 (1966) ; Fabricus v. Horgen,
257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.. 416 Pa. 1, 203
A.2d 796 (1964) ; Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 463, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
20. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
21. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 291 (1971).
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.14(1) (a) (1972) provides: "No intoxicating liquor shall be
sold . . . to any person obviously intoxicated. ... MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972), the
Civil Damage Act, provides: "Every . . . person who is injured in person or property, ...
by any Intoxicated person, or by the Intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in
his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxi-
cating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; . . ."
23. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (1955) (applicable only if sale to a minor or, after notice
to desist, to a habitual drunkard). Section 176.26 (since repealed) did make it a crime to
sell to "any person intoxicated or bordering on intoxication."
tenders and compensation to those injured-were applicable despite
the out-of-state occurrence of the injury.2'
The case that established the pattern of interest analysis 25 to
be followed by other courts is Babcock v. Jackson.2 A New York
resident, while a passenger in a New York automobile, was injured in
Ontario, which prohibits recovery by a guest against a host driver.
The New York Court of Appeals examined the traditional choice-of-
law rule and concluded that its application failed to consider the valid
interests of other jurisdictions, therefore often yielding unjust and
anomalous results. The court concluded that "[j]ustice, fairness
and the 'best practical result'. . . may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." 27
While most of the comment on Babcock has been favorable,", the
decision has caused a number of commentators some discomfort.2
In the case of Griffith v. United Air Lines,s0 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court followed the "interest analysis" established by Bab-
cock. The court abandoned the lex loci delicti rule "in favor of a more
flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests un-
derlying the particular issue before the court."3 1 A Pennsylvania
domiciliary purchased a ticket from United Airlines, Inc. in Philadel-
phia for a round trip flight from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona. In
the course of landing at a scheduled stop at Denver, Colorado, the
plane crashed, causing the immediate death of the traveler. Suit
was brought by the decedent's executor against the airline in Penn-
sylvania.
The choice-of-law issue was whether the Colorado or the Penn-
sylvania Survival Act applied. The Colorado Survival Act limited sur-
vival recovery to earnings lost and expenses sustained by the decedent
24. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W,2d 365, 368 (1957).
25. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMmENTARy ON THE CONFLICT or LAwS 282 (1971).
26. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
27. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
28. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. RIv. 1212 (1963), in which Professors Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig,
Leflar and Reese have expressed their views on the decision.
29. See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-flict of Law, 63 COLUm. L. Rgv. 1212, 1243 (1963) ; Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Prac-
ticing Attorney's Reflections Upon the Opinion and Its Implications, 81 INS. COUNSEL J.
428 (1964). Although Babcock appeared to establish that New York's policy would give
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which "has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation," by virtue of its "relationship or contact with the
occurrence of the parties," the case was soon followed by Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,
209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), which perverted New York's policy of interest
analysis. See Weintraub, The Emerging Problems in Judicial Administration of a State-
Interest Analysis of Tort Conflict of Laws Problems, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 877, 886 (1971).
Presumably, some of the commentators were discomforted by Babcock because the vague-
ness of its policy allowed such unorthodox interpretation.
30. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
31. Id. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805.
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between the time of injury and death.3 2 As death was instantaneous
in this case, application of Colorado law would permit no recovery.
The Pennsylvania Survival Act allowed recovery of the present value
of the decedent's probable future earnings for the period of his life
expectancy, less the cost of his own maintenance during the period
that he would have lived and less the amount that he would have
spent to support his wife and children. 33
In abandoning the place-of-the-wrong rule, in favor of a method
that allows analysis of the underlying policies in issue, the court rea-
soned that Pennsylvania was no less interested in allowing recovery
for Pennsylvania surviving dependents under its liberal act when the
decedent's death occurred in a foreign state, than it would have been
had the crash occurred in Pennsylvania.3 4 Moreover, the court de-
termined that the defendant, who did not shape his conduct in
reliance on Colorado law, would not be unfairly surprised. 3 If Colo-
rado's policy underlying limited recovery for wrongful death was to
relieve Colorado courts of the guesswork involved in reducing future
earnings to their present value, such a policy was inapplicable in
a Pennsylvania forum.3 6 On the other hand, if Colorado's policy was
to shield Colorado defendants from large verdicts, Colorado had some
interest in protecting United Air Lines. But, when viewed in light of
the fact that United was not incorporated in Colorado and did business
in many other states, this "interest" seemed slight. 7
"Interest analysis," as an objective methodology of choice-of-law
analysis, had arrived. Even the Supreme Court of the United States
acknowledged the trend of abandoning the place-of-the-wrong rule
in favor of considering the "interests" of the states that have con-
tacts with the issues and the parties.38 In holding that the Tort
Claims Act3 9 requires federal courts in multistate tort actions to look
first to the law of the state where the acts of negligence took
place°4 0 and that a reading of the statute as a whole, with regard to
its purpose, requires application of the whole law of the state where
32. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-1-9 (Supp. 1960).
83. Law of April 18, 1949, art. VI, § 603, [1949] Pa. Stat. 512 (Repealed 1972). The
limits of recovery were upheld in Skoda v. West Penn. Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 355, 191
A.2d 822, 828-29 (1963).
34. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964).
35. Id. at -, 203 A.2d at 806.
36. Id. at , 203 A.2d at 807.
37. Id. This last point of analysis by the Pennsylvania court involved the weighing of
the competing interests of the two states. It is submitted that Pennsylvania's policy of
compensation was correctly advanced; but for the mere fortuity of the crash in Denver.
Colorado, would have had no interest in the action. For a discussion of this case and
criticism of the subjective weighing of the states' interests, see WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 234 (1971).
38. Richards v. United States, 869 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962).
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, and 2671-2680
(1970).
40. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
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the act occurred, including its choice-of-law rules, 41 the Court stated:
Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some
States to depart from the general conflicts rule in order
to take into account the interests of the State having signi-
ficant contact with the parties to the litigation. We can see
no compelling reason to saddle the Act with an interpreta-
tion that would prevent the federal courts from implementing
this policy in choice-of-law rules where the State in which the
negligence occurred has adopted it.42
However, as many states moved quickly along the charted course
of "interest analysis, ' 43 they were to find that course was not with-
out its tempests.
IV. THE NORTH DAKOTA POSITION
North Dakota also has abandoned the doctrine of lex loci delicti
and has elected the "significant contacts" approach of Babcock
to determine tort choice-of-law questions.4 4 In Issendorf v. Olson, suit
was brought by an automobile guest, a North Dakota resident, against
the owner-operator, also a North Dakota resident, for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident occurring in Minnesota. The con-
flict of laws issue was whether to apply the Minnesota statute of
comparative negligence, 45 the place-of-the-wrong rule, or the North
Dakota statute of contributory negligence, 46 the forum rule.
In holding to abandon the place-of-the-wrong rule,4 7 the court
stated:
Most of the interest factors point to the application of North
Dakota law. . .The plaintiff was a resident of North Dakota
at the time of the accident; his loss of income and the medi-
cal bills he incurred all affect North Dakota's economy; the
vehicle in which he was riding at the time of the accident was
registered and garaged in North Dakota, was insured under
North Dakota rates and was driven by a North Dakota resi-
dent; the trip in which the accident occurred originated in
North Dakota, was to terminate there, and therefore the host-
guest relationship originated in North Dakota....
We believe the contacts with North Dakota are much
more significant than those with Minnesota. The contacts with
Minnesota are minimal. The locus of the accident was fortui-
tous, having resulted from a brief journey into Minnesota for
food, beverage, and entertainment.4 8
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 12-13.
43. See note 19 Aupra.
44. 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972).
45. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1969).
46. N.D. CENT. CODM § 9-10-06 (1959).
47. See note 6 supra.
48. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972).
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Though the court did not feel that North Dakota's contributory neg-
ligence was the "better law, ' 49 the court nevertheless held that the
law of North Dakota should apply because "the significant contacts
in this case are with this State and that accordingly our substantive
law should be applied to this case." 50
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Mager v. Mager,5 1 again
faced a choice-of-laws problem between the substantive law of North
Dakota and that of Minnesota. Plaintiff wife and defendant husband
were both Minnesota residents. In an action by the wife against her
husband for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident that
occurred in Minnesota, the complaint was dismissed by the trial
court 2 on the ground that, under Minnesota law, the claim was barred
by the interspousal immunity doctrine.5 8
On apppeal by the wife, the North Dakota Supreme Court reaf-
firmed "the significant-contacts rule as the choice-of-law rule to
be applied in tort5 4 litigation in this State when the wrong complained
of occurred in a foreign State."55 The court reasoned that, because
the only contact North Dakota had with either the parties or the oc-
currence was the subsequent hospitalization and treatment of the
plaintiff in Fargo, the Issendorf decision must be followed.5 6 In re-
sponse to the appellant's argument that the "better law" should be
applied as in the Wisconsin case of Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel
Co., 57 the North Dakota Supreme Court distinguished Zelinger on
the grounds that one of the parties was a resident of Wisconsin, the
forum state, and that the accident occurred in Wisconsin. 8
V. THE MINNESOTA POSITION
Minnesota had followed the doctrine of lex loci delicti as recently
as 1958, in Phelps v. Benson.59 However, in Milkovich v. Saari,60
the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that it was abandoning that
49. Id. at 755-56.
50. Id. at 756.
51. 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972).
52. Id. at 628.
53. Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). That case abrogated
the interspousal immunity doctrine in Minnesota for all cases arising after December 19,
1969. The accident in Mager occurred on December 14, 1969, just five days before the
Beaudette decision.
54. See First National Bank of Wibaux v. Dreher, 202 N.W.2d 670 (N.D. 1972) where
the North Dakota Supreme Court felt constrained to follow this state's applicable terri-
torially-oriented statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-11, holding that the validity of a con-
tractual provision is to be determined according to the law of the place of performance,
and If such is not indicated, then according to the law of the place where the contract Is
made. The court so held despite its stated awareness of criticism of the inherent weak-
ness and the statutory origin of such rules. Id. at 672.
55. Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626, 628 (N.D. 1972).
56. Id.
57. 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466, 478 (1968).
58. Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626, 629 (N.D. 1972).
59. See note 6 supra.
60. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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territorially-oriented doctrine, and choosing instead to follow the "bet-
ter-law" concept as a methodology and not a rule in choice-of-law
situations.6 1 In Milkovich, plaintiff automobile guest and defendants
automobile owner and driver, all residents of Ontario, Canada, had
traveled to Minnesota on a shopping and pleasure trip. While in Min-
nesota, plaintiff was injured when the car went off the road. Suit
was brought in Minnesota against the owner and driver of the auto-
mobile, which was registered, insured, and garaged in Ontario. The
guest statute of Ontario requires proof of gross negligence to allow
recovery,62 while Minnesota does not have such a statute.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the choice-of-law fac-
tors of "advancement of forum's legitimate governmental interests"
and "application of the better law" required application of Minneso-
ta's common-law rules of negligence rather than Ontario's guest stat-
ute.6 3 The court pointed out that five choice-influencing considera-
tions originally proposed by Professor Leflar,64 a recognized com-
mentator in the field, had been adopted by the court in Schneider
v. Nicols, 6 5 indicating Minnesota's approval of the better law ap-
proach and rejection of the guest statute concept. 6 These choice-in-
fluencing factors are as follows: (1) predictability of results; (2)
maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification
of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental in-
terests; and (5) application of the better rule of law.6 7 Adhering to
the list, the Minnesota court found that the "predictability of results"
was relatively unimportant. As no one plans to have an accident, ex-
cept for the remote possibility of forum shopping, this factor bears
little significance to an automobile accident case. 8 As to "simplifi-
cation of judicial task," the court stated that, in the appropriate
case, it would have no trouble applying the guest statute rule of gross
negligence.6 9 Maintenance of interstate and international order, the
court determined, is not threatened in this case, "where. . . the fo-
rum state has a substantial connection with the facts and issues in-
61. Id. at 170, 203 N.W.2d at 416. In Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66
(1966) and Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966), Minnesota initially re-
placed lex loci delicti with the "significant contacts" doctrine in Babcock v. Jackson. In
Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972), Minnesota adopted the "center of
gravity" test which is the same process as "significant contacts". Milkovich represents a
shift in the court's position on "interest analysis" to the "forum's legitimate governmental
interest" and "better law" tests.
62. ONTARIO REVISED STATUTES ch. 202 § 132(3) (1970).
63. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973).
64. R. LEFLAR, AmEnICAN CoN 'LIcTs LAW (1968).
65. 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
66. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 164, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 (1973).
67. Id. at 161, 203 N.W.2d at 412. See also R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW (1968).
A consideration of the "better law" concept is whether a competing domestic rule "is
anachronistic, behind the times." Id. at 256.
68. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 161, 208 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973).
69. id. at 170, 203 N.W.2d at 416-17.
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volved. ' ' 70 The court cited Minnesota as the place of the accident
and the place of the plaintiff's hospitalization as yielding the "sub-
stantial connection." 71 The court continued:
In that posture, we are concerned that our courts not be call-
ed upon to determine issues under rules which, however, ac-
cepted they may be in other states, are inconsistent with our
own concept of fairness and equity. We might also note that
persons injured in automobile accidents occurring within our
borders can reasonably be expected to require treatment in
our medical facilities, both public and private.73
In considering the last of the factors, "the better rule of law," the
court found any policy considerations that Ontario might have in pro-
tecting hosts from ungrateful guests or in preventing collusive suits
by guest and host unpersuasive. 74
Following Milkovich came Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways
Corporation of Delaware.75 Plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, brought
an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in
Indiana against two defendant nonresident coporations licensed to do
business in Minnesota. The trial court jury returned a verdict finding
the plaintiff 10 percent negligent and the defendants 90 percent neg-
ligent.76 The choice-of-law question presented to the Supreme Court
of Minnesota was whether to apply Minnesota's law of comparative
negligence 77 or Indiana's law of contributory negligence.78
The court discussed the methodology used in the Milkovich deci-
sion, pointing out that only "advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interests" and "application of the better rule of law" are rel-
evant to tort cases.7 9 "Forum governmental interests" were found by
the court to exist by virtue of the plaintiff's residence in the state
and his subsequent medical treatment in Minnesota, an "economic
impact. . . felt by Minnesota residents."8 0 Moreover, though not res-
idents, both defendants were licensed to do business in Minnesota."
On the other hand, the court found Indiana's "governmental inter-
ests" to be limited to the situs of the accident and to the jurisdiction
where plaintiff received initial medical attention, which the court
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See also, Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 1584, 1594 (1966).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. -Minn.-, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
76. Id. at -, 221 N.W.2d at 666.
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1975).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1025 (1968).
79. -Minn.-, 221 N.W.2d 665, 668 (1974). The court stated that application of
"the forum's governmental interests" contemplates the presence of factual contacts with
the forum and policy consideration of the forum relevant to its choice of law.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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concluded were "much less substantial" than Minnesota's "govern-
mental interests. ' 8 2 While not actually applying "the better rule of
law test" of the adopted Leflar methodology, the court pointed out
that, because the plaintiff would recover nothing under Indiana's
contributory negligence rule even though plaintiff was found to be
only 10 percent negligent, they were less than convinced that Indiana
had the "better rule." Moreover, the court declared it had the
"power to find such a result contrary to basic state policy."'83
Myers v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 4 is Minnesota's
most recent response to choice-of-law questions in tort. Plaintiffs, all
Minnesota residents, sustained personal injuries in an automobile
accident that occurred in Louisiana. Suit was brought against defen-
dant insurer, a District of Columbia corporation licensed to do busi-
ness in both Louisiana and Minnesota. Although Louisiana has a direct
action statute 5 that would allow such suit against an insurer, Louisi-
ana's one-year statute of limitations would bar the action if brought in
that state.' Minnesota has no such statutory allowance for direct ac-
tions against insurers, but Minnesota does have a survival statute,
permitting causes of action that arose outside of Minnesota and which
have vested in citizens of Minnesota.87 Application of this survival
statute would allow the cause of action under Minnesota's six-year
statute of limitations18 The conflict of laws issue was whether
to apply Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations, a bar to plain-
tiff's cause of action, or to apply Minnesota's survival statute, which
would allow suit.
82. Id.
83. Id. at - , 221 N.W.2d at 669. One may infer from this statement that the court
would have declared Minnesota's comparative negligence the "better law," had the court
felt compelled to apply the "better rule of law" test.
84. - Minn.-, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974).
85. LA. REV. STAT. Title 22, § 655 (Supp. 1975) provides in part:
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs . . . shall have a
right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the
policy; and such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against
both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido, in the parish in which
the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an action could
be brought against either the insured or the insurer under the general rules
of venue prescribed by Art. 42, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The right of direct
action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or
delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy
contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or
Injury occurred within the State of Louisiana. . . . It Is the intent of this
Section that any action brought hereunder shall be subject to all of the law-
ful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged
by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms
and conditions of such policy or contract are not In violation of the laws of
this State ...
86. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3536 (West 1965) provides a one-year statute of limita-
tions on tort claims.
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.14 (1945) provides: "When a cause of action has arisen
outside this state and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon Is there
barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintained in this state unless the plain-
tiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued."
88. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (1945).
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The court held that plaintiffs could bring a direct cause of action
against the insurer, pursuant to the Louisiana direct action statute,
since the Minnesota Survival Statute expressed a legislative intent
to allow the vested cause of action when commenced within the Min-
nesota statute of limitations, even though the Louisiana statute of
limitations would bar such an action. 9 In making its determination,
the court focused on "advancement of the forum's governmental in-
terests" and "application of the better rule of law," 90 even though
a determination of the latter consideration was not reached.9 1
The court's analysis of the "governmental interests" test consid-
ered the interests of both the forum and Louisiana . 2 The court
found Louisiana's interest, under its direct action statute, to be the
protection of claims of the public, including plaintiffs. But the court
concluded that Louisiana's protection interest would be nominally
served by having its one-year statute of limitations applied when non-
residents were seeking application of another state's statute of limit-
ations in that state's courts 3 However, the "governmental interests"
of Minnesota were found to be significant, by providing access to
its courts for its citizens and by considering its socio-legal policies,
expressed by its legislature and courts.9 4 The court, then, examined
which of its competing "interests" should be advanced, its statute
which allows survival of vested claims or its prohibition of direct ac-
tions against insurers. Holding that the major consideration of Min-
nesota as the forum state is the availability of its courts to enforce
the vested rights of its citizens, the Supreme Court of Minnesota al-
lowed the action.99
89. Myers v. Government Employees Insurance Co., - Minn.-, 225 N.W.2d 238,
243-44 (1974).
90. Id. at -, 225 N.W.2d at 242.
91. Id. at -, 225 N.W.2d at 244. The court indicated that the "better-rule" test should
be used only when the other choice-influencing factors provide no resolution.
92. Id. at - , 225 N.W.2d at 242-48. Although not discussed by the court, the Myers
case involved the use of de'pecage, a multiple-issue choice-of-law approach whereby refer.
ences to the law of different jurisdictions ar used to decide different issues. The Minnesota
court ruled that Louisiana's direct action statute gave plaintiffs a vested cause of action. In
addition, the court determined that Minnesota's Survival Statute allowed the cause of action
to endure when commenced within the Minnesota Statute of Limitations. For discussion
of the merits of de'pecage as a choice-of-law approach, see Reese, De'pecage: A Common
Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. Rgv. 58 (1973) ; Weintraub, Beyond De-pe-
cage: A "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law in Consumer Credit Transactions and a
Critique of the Territorial Application of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 CASE
WESTERN RESERVE L. REv. 16 (1974) ; Wilde, De'pecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S.
CAL. L. REv. 329 (1968).
93. - Minn.- , 225 N.W.2d 238, 243 (1974).
94. rd. at -, 225 N.W.2d at 244.
95. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMmENTARY ON THE CONFLIeT OF LAWS 39 (1971). Although
Weintraub's is but a suggested method of analysis, it is submitted that it is a generally
accurate picture of the process of interest analysis, endorsed by its proponents.
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VI. COMMENT: RAMIFICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
"Interest analysis" as a process for the resolution of choice-of-
law problems may be seen as a methodology in steps: 9
(1) The forum court must focus on the apparently conflicting
rules in the jurisdictions 'having contacts with the parties or
the occurrence.
(2) The forum court must examine the policies underlying
each state's rules to determine which would be meaning-
-fully advanced. If, at that state of the process, it appears
that only the policies of one state would be so advanced, then
no "true ' 97 conflict exists. Thus the choice-of-law question
should be resolved in favor of that jurisdiction whose inter-
ests are meaningfully advanced.
(3) If the competing policies of the jurisdictions having
contacts with the particular fact situation are determined to
be in "true" conflict, the forum court might then look to a
number of proposed solutions: (a) it might consider policies
or trends in the development of the law that the competing
jurisdictions share;9 8 (b) it might employ Leflar's five choice
influencing factors; 99 (c) the Restatement (Second) might
provide the answer with its "most significant relationship"
test; 100 (d) the court might apply the forum rule, as one au-
thor has suggested; 10 ' (e) or election might be made for an-
other author's "principles of preference.' 11 2 For tort actions
involving guest-host automobile accidents in which no policy
of any of the concerned jurisdictions can be meaningfully ad-
vanced, the Neumeier rules might provide the answer.10 3
It is submitted that the above process of "interest analysis"
would show that Issendorj is not a "true" conflict. Step (1) reflects
96. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives In the Conflict o! Laws, 1959 DUKE
L. J. 171, 174 (1959) ; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEx. L. REV. 657,
667-74 (1959). But see Leflar, True "False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 BOSTON U.L. REV. 164,
170-73 (1968), wherein Leflar opposes the term "false conflict" for any case in which
two states have different laws on the same issue where both have contacts with the oc-
currence in issue. He would use the term to indicate the situation where both states have
identical rules or different rules which would yield the same result.
97. See WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (1971).
98. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 99 (1971).
99. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (1968).
100. IRSTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
101. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757 (1963).
102. D. CAvERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965).
103. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 835 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
Neurneler has been termed a case "unprovided for" by interest analysis. The decedent was
a resident of Ontario, a guest statute Jurisdiction, and the accident occurred there. The
defendant was a resident of New York where his automobile was insured. Ontario had no
interest in protecting the New York host and his insurer from tort liability, and New
York had no interest in applying its law to allow recovery to a non-resident injured in
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conflict in the rules of the two jurisdictions-Minnesota's statute
of comparative negligence versus North Dakota's statute of contribu-
tory negligence. Step (2), however, reveals that, but for the fortuity
of the accident happening in Minnesota, that state would have no
connection to the parties or the occurrence and, consequently, no
policy that would be meaningfully advanced. North Dakota, on the
other hand, could advance its policies as set out previously. There-
fore, the court reached the correct result but for the wrong reasons.
In employing its ",significant contacts" test, as opposed to resolu-
tion of the problem as a "false" conflict, the court appears to be
"counting contacts,' 0 4 particularly in regard to the place where the
guest-host relationship originated. A similar "significant contacts"
finding by the New York Court of Appeals in Dym v. Gordon' °5
generated substantial confusion in New York as to the meaning of
"significant contacts." However, in Tooker v. Lopez, 0° the New York
Court of Appeals determined that the place where the guest-host re-
lationship originated or is centered is wholly irrelevant to the policies
of the concerned jurisdictions. 10 7 Clearly, such a territorial approach
is inconsistent with interest analysis.
In Mager, the North Dakota Supreme Court, it is submitted, again
faced no "true" conflict. But for the fortuity of the situs of the
accident being North Dakota and the subsequent hospitalization in
that state, North Dakota had no connection with the fact situation
and no policy to advance. It might be argued that North Dakota does
have a policy of insuring compensation to its medical creditors. As
his home state. Questioning the utility of interest analysis in such a case, the court de-
vised three choice-of-law rules for determination :
(1) When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled In the same state,
and the car is registered there, the law of that state should control and determine the
standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
(2) When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of
the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the
victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile
and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in the
absence of special circumstances--be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a
defense.
(3) In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in dif-
ferent states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of de-
cision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown
that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law
purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing
great uncertainy for litigants. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
As none of the North Dakota or Minnesota decisions discussed can be termed
"unprovided for" cases, the Neumeier rules will not be analyzed In this Note. But for in-
depth discussion and analysis, see 2ymposium--Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict,
I HOFSTRA L. Rv. 93 (1973). Although the Neumeier rules and their taint of territorialism
are outside the scope of this Note and must be a topic for another paper, it should be
noted that none of those who wrote for the above symposium favor these rules.
104. See Weintraub, The Emerging Problems in Judicial Administration of a State-Interest
Analysis of Tort Conflict of Laws Problems, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 877, 883-89 (1971) for a
discussion of "counting contacts" in New York cases.
105. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
106. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
107. Id. at 579 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at 400 n.2, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 527 n.2.
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such, the case would present a "true" conflict of competing states'
policies. But surely this policy can't compete with Minnesota's pol-
icies regulating the marital rights of its domiciliaries. 108
In Milkovich, as in Mager, the forum court's only connections with
the parties or the occurrence were that the forum state was the situs of
the accident, a territorial "contact," and the place of plaintiff's hos-
pitalization. It is submitted that the merely fortuitous connection
with the forum as the place of the injury and plaintiff's hospitaliza-
tion render this action, under the suggested process of interest analy-
sis, a "false" conflict. As in Mager, though the forum might have an
interest in protecting its medical creditors, Ontario's policy behind its
guest statute, that of protecting the host and buyers of liability insur-
ance, is more compelling. After all, it is Ontario, not Minnesota, that
would have to live with the result. Additionally, the fact that all
Minnesota medical creditors had been paid precluded any merit to
this compensatory protection policy. The court's fear of "hospital-
shopping" or "litigation-directed pressures on the payment of debts
to medical facilities"'1 9 appears something less than a policy consid-
eration which would be meaningfully advanced.
Although the case adopts Leflar's choice-influencing considera-
tions, the Minnesota court presupposed maintenance of interstate and
international relations when it determined "substantial connection"
with the occurrence. Such presupposition destroys the merit of any
test of "interest analysis." In addition, the court's finding of "govern-
mental interests" viewing itself as a "justice administering state"
dictating application of rules consistent with its own ideas of fairness
and equity,110 the "better law," precluded any real analysis of pol-
icies which Ontario might have regarding the issue before the court.
Rather, the Milkovich decision stands as a case decided on the law
of the forum, under the guise of "interest analysis."
The Schwartz decision adhered to the Leflar methodology of "in-
terest analysis" more closely than Milkovich. Though the court stated
that only "governmental interests" and "better rule of law" are rele-
vant to tort cases, the decision emphasized that policy considerations
and factual contacts were necessary prerequisites."' It is submitted
that the case could have been determined a "false" conflict; Indi-
ana's only connections were "place-of-the-injury" and "place of medi-
108. For a discussion of compensatory protection of medical creditors as a policy, see
R. WEiNTRAuD, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 246 (1971).
109. Milkovlch v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 171, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973). For a discus-
sion of this hypothetical policy in Milkovich, see Conflict of Laws: Minnesota rejects the
"Significant Contacts" Doctrine in Favor of the "Better Law" Test, 58 M&NN. L. 1Ev.
199, 204-05 (1973-74).
110. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 171, 203 N.W.2d 417 (1973).
111. Schwartz v. Consolidated Frelghtways Corp. of Del., -M-Minn.- , 221 N.W.2d
665, 668 (1974).
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cal treatment." In choosing to consider medical treatment as an
"interest," the court realistically concluded that it was far less com-
pelling than Minnesota's more substantial economic policy consider-
ations. The plaintiff was continuing to receive medical care in Min-
nesota where he was currently domiciled, "saddled with crippling
physical disabilities arising from the collision. Thus, the economic
impact of these injuries and of subsequent litigation will be felt by
Minnesota residents."'
The "better law" test was not considered in Schwartz since the
"governmental interests" of Minnesota were held sufficient to apply
Minnesota law. However, the court's statement that, because Indi-
ana's contributory negligence would leave the plaintiff entirely un-
compensated, "[i]t is within the ambit of this court's policy to find
such a result contrary to basic state policy,"11 3 causes some concern.
One author has recommended the "better law" consideration if
two conditions are met: (1) there must be a true conflict of policies
underlying the laws of each state; and (2) the domestic law of each
state must be significantly and legitimately advanced by application
of its own law." 4 However, the "better law" test has been criticized
as an escape device, affording courts a means to avoid dealing with
conflicts problems. 115 Moreover, the "better law" test raises the juris-
prudential question of judicial legislation: should courts determine
the merits of social policy established by legislative action? The an-
swer must be that such determination is surely outside the bounds of
judicial authority.
The Myers case presented the Supreme Court of Minnesota with
a "true" conflict of laws problem . 1 6 The two states involved have
conflicting laws-application of Minnesota's "borrowing statute"
would allow the action to survive, while application of the Louisiana
one-year statute of limitations would prohibit the action. In addition,
both states have social policies which would be advanced: Minneso-
ta seeks to provide its citizens access to its courts, while Louisiana
seeks to protect its defendants from long-term threats of suit, so as to
provide them peace of mind.
In its decision, the court determined and, it is submitted, cor-
rectly so, that Louisiana had at best a minimal interest in having
another state's statute of limitations apply to nonresidents in that
112. Id.
113. Id. at -, 203 N.W.2d at 669.
114. See R. WEVINTRAtB, CommEN'TARy ON THE CoNvcr OF LAWS 244-461 (1971).
115. See Cavers, Conflict of Laws Round Table, the Value of Principled Preferences, 49
TEx. L. Rsv. 211 (1971).
116. Though Leflar, as cited by the court, would term the case a "false conflict," he
defines the term as indicative of a fact situation in which the relevant laws of both Juris-
dictions differ but in which both have policy interests to advance. See Myers v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co., -Minn.-, 225 N.W.2d 238, 242 (1974).
NOTES
state's courts. 117 However, the Minnesota court failed to consider any
interests in regard to defendants that Louisiana might have in set-
ting time limitations for suit. Such a policy consideration seems both
plausible and significant. Though the policy of the forum court to
provide judicial access to its citizens seems more compelling, the
Minnesota court, as in Milkovich, failed to remain true to its adopted
methodology of "interest analysis" by not giving any real considera-
tion to the "legitimate governmental interests" of the other state in
interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
The territorially-oriented rule of lex loci delicti fails to examine
the significant interests of jurisdictions having connections with the
parties or the occurrence in tort litigation. As a result, the great
majority of jurisdictions have replaced that doctrine with "interest
analysis" as a method for resolving choice-of-law problems in tort.
The North Dakota courts have elected the "significant contacts"
approach of interest analysis. The potential problems inherent in such
an approach are the danger of considering contacts, with a view
toward quantity rather than quality, and the failure to resolve the
conflict as "false" when only one jurisdiction has a policy to advance
even though other jurisdictions have some "contact" with the parties
or the occurrence.
Minnesota, which originally abandoned lex loci delicti in favor of
"significant contacts," has adopted Leflar's five choice-influencing
considerations as an interest analysis approach. Aside from the
"better law" test which clothes the judge in legislative robes, this
methodology offers a just and workable solution. But the Minnesota
courts have not been faithful to their adopted approach. They have
presumed "legitimate governmental interests" without first consider-
ing any policies of the other interested jurisdictions that could be
meaningfully advanced.
GREGORY JOHNSON
117. See Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2c 27 (5th Cir. 1970), affd 404 U.S. 97
(1971) in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's one-year statute
of limitations is a procedural restraint which bars the remedy, but does not extinguish the
right.

